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10. 
reconnaissance regiment could throw out 60 Staghounds 
across a two division front — had increased in power 
and reliability and they were a natural utility and secu-
rity force to complement any armoured division. Had 
anti-tank guns been grouped with these units then 
they might have provided screens that secured (if not 
exploited) tactical successes and covered preparations 
for follow-up phases. 
This version of events is a compelling one in many 
quarters. Blaming technology for battlefield ineffec-
tiveness eliminates die need for analysis of the human 
side of events — generalship, leadership, training, 
morale and so on. 
11. Canadians in particular should note that the first-ever 
work on the Canadian armoured experience is forth-
coming in the summer of 1995. John F. Wallace, Dragons 
of Steel — Canadian Armour in Two World Wars 
(Canada: General Store Publishing, 1995). 
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Paul Fussell, who served as an infantry officer 
in France where he was seriously wounded, 
sees the Second World War as a meaningless 
struggle in which the mindless devotees of 
"chicken-shi t" (or its approximate Brit ish 
equivalent, "bullshit") sent hundreds of thou-
sands of hapless young men to their deaths. 
They did not simply get killed, they were blown 
apart, the battlefield strewn with guts, brains 
and severed limbs. Soldiers were forced into a 
dreary uniformity and lost their identities. Their 
only forms of release were demotic language, 
cigarettes, drink and frantic masturbation. Life 
in wartime was mostly numbingly boring but 
was punctuated by periods of sheer terror in 
which even seasoned veterans soiled their 
pants. The military was incompetent, chaotic 
and wasteful; the normal state of affairs summed 
up in the acronym SNAFU. 
War is indeed ugly and brutal, but the con-
stant repetition of this unpleasant truth soon 
becomes tiresome, and for all the lies, cruelty, 
suffering, hypocrisy, stupidity and vindictive-
ness, the Allied cause was a just one. The world 
had to be rid of Nazism, fascism and Japanese 
imperialism, and the struggle against these 
evils was far from pointless. In spite of the 
author's noble sentiments about the horrors of 
war, his sparkling prose style and his wide-
ranging interests, it is not really clear what the 
book is intended to achieve. Much of what 
Fussell has to say about the social history of 
the war has been better said by historians such 
as John Mor ton Blum, Angus Calder and 
Paul Addison. As a study of the literature of 
the war years, it falls well below the standard 
set by his earlier study of The Great War and 
Modern Memory. The examination of popular 
culture is superficial, remarks on Germany in 
wartime are very wide of the mark, and there 
is a great deal that is downright false. 
M u c h is m a d e of t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n by 
Cyril Connolly's Horizon to the war effort, in 
that it upheld civilized values. Its standards 
were "breathtaking" and it achieved an "unbe-
lievable excellence." The awful and indolent 
Cyril Connolly's "brave uncompromising atti-
tude" sustained him through the "horrors and 
darkness" of the war. In fact Horizon only had 
a maximum of 5 000 subscribers and much of 
it was pretentious, snobbish, self-pitying drivel. 
Connolly's bon mot, "perfect fear casteth out 
love," said here to be an injunction to a "new 
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frankness," was uttered when he was forced by 
a V bomb raid to disengage hastily from a sex-
ual embrace with a lady of quality. This was 
about as close as he ever came to the "horrors 
and darkness." Similarly it would be quite 
wrong to see Osbert Sitwell and Evelyn Waugh 
as "baroque" stylists reacting to the drabness 
of "Churchill's War." To English readers, nei-
ther have a particularly extravagant style and 
their chronicles of the eccentric, the dotty and 
the socially exclusive are a long and honoured 
tradition. The war was often drab, though the 
British restaurants were much nicer affairs 
than is suggested here and were greatly missed 
when abolished several years after the war, 
but Churchill's war certainly was not. Both in 
his public personality and in his private life the 
prime minister was the antithesis of the drab, 
and few begrudged him his obvious enjoyment 
of the good things in life. 
Much is made of the pernicious use of 
rumours, although few details are provided of 
the activities of the rumour mill, nor is it men-
tioned that it was run by the Queen Mother's 
amiable but modestly talented brother. This is 
a pity, for they produced "rumours" of stag-
gering inanity. For one who takes such a dim 
view of rumours it is surprising that he spreads 
a few of his own. Poles launched cavalry 
changes against tanks. WRENs were inspected 
to see if they were wearing impenetrable black 
knickers ("blackouts") before being let near 
sex-starved sailors. AMGOT meant something 
very rude in Turkish (it was reputed to mean 
"shit"). German soldiers spent their time 
reading Mein Kampf and the effusions of 
Alfred Rosenberg and Hans Frank. 
A sensitive American marine, Eugene B. Sledge, 
discovered on Peleliu that troops were 
expendable, a fact that was difficult to accept 
in a nation and a culture that claimed to value 
human life and individual rights. Paul Fussell 
agrees, calling the war stupid and sadistic and 
insisting that only the young and the innocent 
could possible think that it was good, justified 
or even necessary. Michael D. Doubler's brilliant 
analysis of the performance of the Americans 
in the European Theatre of Operations, does 
much to put the ghastliness of war in its proper 
perspective. 
As a professional soldier Doubler knows 
that war is a very nasty business and that 
armies make terrible blunders, but he shows 
how quickly the Americans adapted to unfa-
miliar conditions in Europe, how ready the 
military was to accept innovations, how open 
to suggestions from the lowliest G.I.s. He takes 
on the thesis by Russell Weighley and sup-
ported by Paul Fussell that it was America's 
industrial might and technical know-how that 
won the war. He argues that the United States 
did not "rumble to victory," but won the war 
by learning on the job and mastering the art of 
combined operations. 
The Americans had learned a lot in North 
Africa, but they were initially at a loss to know 
how to deal with the bocage country in 
Normandy. There was virtually no radio con-
tact between tanks and infantry or between 
ground troops and aircraft. They quickly 
learned how to combine infantry and armour, 
found novel uses for tank destroyers and over-
came the difficulties of close air support. They 
soon came to understand how to launch com-
plicated combined arms operations in which 
infantry, armour, artillery, anti-aircraft units 
and engineers, with effective air support were 
used to great effect. 
Once they had learned how to deal with 
the bocage, helped by Sgt Culin's ingenious 
hedgerow cutter, made of pieces of German 
beach obstacles, they were confronted with 
further problems. They had to learn how to fight 
in towns and villages, how to attack German 
fortresses and pill boxes, how to cross rivers and 
how to fight in the forests. They overcame the 
difficulties of all but the last. The Huertgen 
Forest campaign was a disaster and they never 
learned how to fight in the woods. The Germans 
were amazed that they even tried. 
American commanders did their best to 
destroy the enemy and to end the war as quickly 
as possible while keeping casualties at a min-
imum. Losses were very high against a deter-
mined and skilful German defence and there 
was a very high incidence of combat exhaustion. 
An average infantry squad of 12 men could 
expect to suffer two killed, five wounded, one 
missing, two evacuated for trench foot and two 
incapacitated by combat exhaustion. There 
were also serious deficiencies in the replace-
ment system. The Americans succeeded not 
because they had more men and resources but 
because of their brilliant organizational skills, 
their ability to learn and to improvise. Their 
basic doctrine was sound and combined with 
experience, thorough training and openness 
to innovation, it led to victory. 
Doubler's eagerness to demolish Weighley's 
thesis sometimes leads him a little astray. 
American material superiority really did count 
for something, as he shows in his admirable 
account of the Battle of the Bulge. The Germans 
may have had better arms and armour that the 
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Americans, but they were hopelessly out-
numbered and replacements grew increasingly 
scarce. The point is that Americans learned 
how to use what they had with great skill. 
Their campaign was not the mindless carnage 
that Paul Fussell condemns, but a brilliant oper-
ations for a good cause. Doubler's magnificent 
book is a fine tribute to the U.S. forces in Europe 
and a salutary corrective to Paul Fussell's despair 
at the pointlessness of it all. 
Gaynor Kavanagh, Museums and the First World War: 
A Social History 
DESMOND MORTON 
Gaynor Kavanagh, Museums and the First World 
War: A Social History, New York: Leicester 
University Press, 1994, 200 pp. £25. 
Like other institutions in 1914-18, Britain's 
museums had to endure the initial challenges 
and ultimate exhaustion of a society falling 
into the first total war. How could institutions 
that symbolized the Victorian faith in progress 
adjust to the self-evident regression into bar-
barism. How could they even survive when 
public and private efforts had to be channelled 
into a struggle for survival? And how could that 
struggle best be memorialized when museums 
themselves were swept to the other edge of 
public concern and consciousness? 
Gaynor Kavanagh, a lecturer in museum 
studies at the University of Leicester turned to 
the problem for her M.Phil, dissertation and has 
transformed it into a readable and surprisingly 
interesting book, covering provincial museums 
in England as well as the great national muse-
ums in London. Scotland, and other parts of the 
British.Isles are left to their own chroniclers. 
Amidst all the questions and problems that 
afflicted a profoundly civilian society trapped 
in a war of nightmare magnitude, museums sur-
vived on the margins. Their curators worried 
about risks to their collections, staffing short-
ages when younger members enlisted and their 
relevance to the national struggle. Faced with 
German air raids, the British Museum moved 
some of its greatest treasures into a new and 
unused section of London's underground rail-
way. While the Museum suffered little damage 
apart from fragments of British anti-aircraft 
shells, deterioration from environmental con-
ditions in the tunnel forced curators to plead 
for a major post-war investment to control dete-
rioration. Good came out of evil, argues 
Kavanagh. A laboratory was opened in 1922 to 
struggle with oxidation and mould. "The British 
Museum since this time has been at the fore-
front of scientific conservation, especially 
within the field of antiquities" (p. 35). 
Bewildered by wartime problems it had 
never contemplated, Britain's government 
floundered badly. Faced with a fiscal crisis, in 
March 1916 it ordered all its national muse-
ums closed, not for safety but to save £26 000. 
The Times led the protests as indignant citizens 
raged that cinematic vulgarity would continue 
while the educational uplift of museums would 
be sacrificed — precisely when soldiers on 
leave, particularly from the colonies, could 
benefit most. Once closed to the public, many 
museums were converted to offices for prolif-
erating wartime ministries. A public outcry 
kept the new Air Ministry from occupying the 
British Museum; it would have become a legit-
imate target on the dubious assumption that 
German bombers knew their targets. Instead, it 
became a warehouse for the property of interned 
Germans. 
As servants of public institutions, museum 
staff were expected to do a little more than "their 
bit" for King and Country. Sir Frederic Kenyon, 
director of the British Museum, had encouraged 
his pre-war staff to join the Territorial Army. 
Once war came, he and many of his staff were 
soon on their way to France. Between volun-
teering and conscription, only 18 of the 253 men 
of military age had not offered themselves, 
"some of whom were incapable of service." 
More than half of Kenyon's staff were too old 
for military service. Women, volunteers, old 
men and disabled veterans took over the respon-
sibilities as museum workers all over England 
enlisted. While half the women who entered 
the British workforce during the war remained 
after the Armistice, museums were conserva-
tive employers. Most kept their promise to 
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